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after a small group of RAF members shot and killed a civil-
ian while successfully freeing Andreas Baader from incar-
ceration, they coalesced as a organization and for the first 
time showed a willingness to resort to violence to achieve 
political goals. Unsurprisingly, the RAF’s tactics became 
ever more violent following a short stent training Palestin-
ian guerilla units in Gaza and the West bank. This violent 
behavior achieved headlines throughout the BRD, begin-
ning in 1972 with the bombing of US military barracks in 
Frankfurt, leaving 13 soldiers stationed at the base badly in-
jured. Similar attacks and kidnappings continued regularly 
until they reached an apex in both magnitude and infamy 
in the fall of 1977, during what is known as the Deutscher 
Herbst (German Fall). During this time, the RAF members 
kidnapped Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the president of the Fed-
eration of German Employers’ Associations, and executed 
him near the German-Belgian border some five weeks later. 
Over the same time period, four Palestinian terrorists asso-
ciated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) hijacked Lufthansa flight 181, killing the pilot and 
abducting 86 passengers. In exchange for the passengers, the 
hijackers demanded the release of 13 RAF prisoners held by 
the German government, but were ultimately unsuccessful. 
In all, the RAF was responsible for the death of at least 35 
people, including the four American soldiers during attacks 
on two US military bases in May 1972.
Although terrorist attacks are often construed as a large-
ly 21st century phenomenon, the Federal Republic of 
Germany (BRD) faced similarly formidable acts of vi-
olence dating all the way to the 1960s. Chief among the 
German domestic terror groups who oversaw such vio-
lence was the Red Army Faction (RAF), which formed 
in 1970 and continued to operate until its official dis-
solution in 1998. As such, post World War II policy 
developments pertaining to German counterterrorism 
efforts have occurred in reaction to two fundamentally 
different security challenges. The first as stated above, 
arose out of a need to combat domestic left-wing mili-
tant groups such as the RAF; the second was necessitat-
ed by the events occurring on 9/11, intended to combat 
foreign Islamic terrorist organizations. This paradoxical 
shift of the general aims of German counterterrorism 
initiatives has forced governmental security agencies to 
revamp their policies and practices while also driving a 
fierce public debate. 
In the 1960s, left-wing radicalism gained greater mo-
mentum, backed in large part, by student movements 
comprised mainly of the postwar generation of Ger-
mans. Among this new generation of German youth 
were the founders and leaders of the early RAF, Ulrike 
Meinhof, Andreas Baader, and Gudrun Ensslin. In 1970, 
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Although there are some instances where the RAF 
worked in conjunction with foreign governments 
(especially the German Democratic Republic in 
East Germany, or DDR) and other terrorist groups, 
nearly all of their attacks occurred on German soil. 
As a result, the BRD’s counterterrorism measures 
focused on domestic, secular terror organizations. 
Until the attacks of September 11th in the United 
States, most of the German efforts were geared to-
wards homegrown threats. The German government 
did not have total freedom, however, as many checks 
were put on the BRD’s various national security or-
ganizations. This imperative to contain governmen-
tal power and influence is largely a product of the 
widely publicized abuses that occurred during the 
Nazi era. 
There were three different acts relating to coun-
terterrorism that occurred in the BRD in direct re-
sponse to the RAF; these occurred in 1972, 1976 and 
1978. These three separate acts criminalized the for-
mation of terrorist organizations or the support and 
encouragement of serious violent crimes; strength-
ened the powers of prosecution authorities; and 
limited the legal rights of the defense, in particular, 
allowing terrorist activity to be tried under differ-
ent penal conditions than other criminal acts. Addi-
tionally, in 1977 the BRD implemented the contact 
ban law that limited the rights of the defense and 
allowed law enforcement bodies to isolate victims 
that have been charged with terror-related crimes. 
Beyond legal instruments, another key change that 
was precipitated by the RAF was the moderniza-
tion and computerization of police and intelligence 
services, where databases were required to be kept 
on members of the RAF and other left-wing terror 
groups. Although the creation of a new digital da-
tabase for criminals may seem innocuous to many 
observers, it certainly was not for many German 
citizens, who had grown distrusting of such pro-
grams following egregious abuses seen among the 
Nazis. Even though these developments may seem 
commonplace when observed through the lens of 
an American citizen, these legal changes and instru-
ments led to an intense debate over whether they 
challenged the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the German citizenry. 
THE PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN 
COUNTERTERROR POLICY
Prior to the escalation in RAF attacks beginning in 
1972, German collective understanding of terrorism 
was framed overwhelmingly by the way it related to 
the Nazi government from 1933-1945. This history 
shaped a disjointed counterterrorism policy aimed 
more at leveraging against federal overreach rather 
than external national security threats. This securi-
ty apparatus was based on three overarching princi-
ples: first, police and security authorities had to be 
organized along both federal and state lines, meaning 
that the 16 German Länder (states) were equipped 
with their own police, intelligence services, and legal 
institutions each operating independently from the 
federal branch. Germany has no federal police force 
that serves as the overarching national authority for 
domestic security, similar to the FBI in the United 
States. Second, there had to be a clear legal and polit-
ical distinction between police and intelligence ser-
vices, as stated by the separation clause. Third, Ger-
man authorities had to distinguish between internal 
and external security issues, creating a strong separa-
tion between the police and military. 
These three guiding principles led to the establish-
ment 39 separate departments tasked with protecting 
national security interests. The most important of 
these offices in regards to counterterrorism strategy 
are the Federal Office for the Protection of the Con-
stitutions (BfV), tasked with domestic intelligence 
gathering that includes a federal office and 16 differ-
ent Länder offices, the Federal Criminal Police Of-
fice (BKA) that provides information exchange and 
central databases for criminal records, finger prints, 
photographs, and DNA analysis in conjunction 
with 16 State Criminal Police Offices (Länderkrim-
inalamte or LKAs. Additionally, there are the Feder-
al Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst or 
BND), the Military Counterintelligence Service (Mil-
itärischer Abschirmdiesnt or MAD), the Federal Bor-
der Guard (BGS), and the Customs Criminal Office 
(ZKA). 
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9/11 and Resulting Policy Decisions
Following the terrorist events of September 11 in New 
York City, the BRD was required to reconsider the legal 
procedure and practices of its counterterrorism opera-
tions. This decision was further motivated by the fact that 
three of the four hijackers had been educated and radical-
ized in Hamburg. Prior to fall of the World Trade Center 
towers, the notion of terrorism was considered a domestic 
issue in the BRD. As a result, several new measures were 
required in order to meet the challenge of a dangerous 
transnational right-wing Islamist threat. This change in 
policy took place in two separate security packages that 
sought to achieve five key objectives: destroy terrorist 
structures through comprehensive searches and investi-
gations, repel terrorists before they can launch attacks in 
Germany, enhance international cooperation in combat-
ing terrorism, protect the German population and reduce 
the vulnerability of the country, and remove the root caus-
es of terrorism. 
The first security package focused primarily on two issues, 
the first of which led to the abolishment of the “religious 
privilege.” It became possible to ban certain religious or-
ganizations if their purpose or activities ran counter to 
the provisions of criminal law, were directed against the 
constitutional order, or disregarded the “idea of interna-
tional understanding.” This amendment entered into force 
in December 2001 and is primarily targeted at fundamen-
talist Islamic organizations that do not reject the use of vi-
olence. The BRD has begun to back away from this stance 
in recent years, making the provision less controversial 
than it was at the outset. The second measure came in the 
form of a new paragraph in the penal code that criminal-
ized membership in, or support of, terrorist organizations 
based in other countries. This law came into force in Sep-
tember 2002 and for the first time it became possible for 
convictions to be made on the basis of membership in a 
foreign terrorist group, even if the group had not estab-
lished any kind of formal base within Germany, in which 
case it would fall under different legal statutes. 
A second security package was passed in January 2002 and 
dealt with a broader range of issues than the first. The plan 
contained changes to 17 laws and various administrative 
decrees. The main goal was to strengthen the rights and 
capabilities of security authorities. The new measures al-
lowed for improvements in information sharing between 
agencies, better identification and background checks in 
visa application procedures, and allowed for the use of 
armed sky marshals as well as the use of firearms by securi-
ty officials on civilian airliners. Another provision granted 
police institutions, intelligence agencies and other law-en-
forcement entities the power to obtain information from 
various public and private services such as telecommunica-
tions, mail, air traffic, banking records, employment infor-
mation and university records.  Although this information 
can only be acquired after obtaining special permission 
from the government with oversight by a parliamentary 
body, the law greatly extended the reach and scope of intel-
ligence and law-enforcement agencies involved in counter-
terrorism operations. During 2012, the policies enacted in 
the early 2000s were renewed and currently constitute the 
framework through which the BRD conducts counterter-
rorism operations. 
Looking to the Future
The history of counterterrorism operations in the BRD has 
been shaped in large part by four overarching factors: the 
Nazi period, left-wing terrorist activity by the RAF and 
others, police and intelligence abuses by the East German 
Staatssicherheit (Stasi) and others institutions in the DDR, 
and the rise of right-wing Islamic terrorism beginning with 
9/11. The events that occurred during Nazi rule and in the 
DDR have left an indelible mark on the German public con-
scious, creating a situation where most government officials 
and citizens alike are inherently reluctant to grant any insti-
tution too much authority over security operations. At the 
same time, the past threat of domestic terrorism and the 
current issue of transnational threats have forced Germany 
to have a serious policy discussion regarding the limits of 
governmental power. The paradox between the surrender 
of individual privacy and privilege in return for a govern-
ment that is capable of combating terrorism may be as prev-
alent now as it ever has been, but it is an issue that Germany 
has struggled with for decades. The unique history of Ger-
many during the 20th century highlights these concerns 
and the relationship between law-enforcement, intelligence 
agencies and the judicial system is still a major theme in the 
public discourse and will be for some time to come. 
The current situation in Germany presents a few problems 
that present both similarities and differences with the last 
half-century in the BRD. Three of the concerns at the fore-
front of discussion are: fears that terrorist activity similar to 
 Page 13: A car bombing by members of the Red Army Faction in 1981 targeting the U.S Air Forces in Europe headquarters at the Ramstein Air Base
  Page 14: A training exercise by GSG 9, the German counterterrorism and special operations unit
 Page 16: Lufthansa flight 181 - hijacked by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1977.  The German homegrown terror
 group, the Red Army Faction, trained militants in Palestine
Fall 2015 | 16
that seen in Paris on the satirical news outlet Charlie Hebdo 
will occur, that issues with the current influx of Syrian refu-
gees may worsen and result in negative societal and political 
outcomes, or that anti-Islam nationalist groups like PEGI-
DA will gain greater momentum, exacerbating a deepen-
ing rift between Islamic and nationalist groups in Germany 
and giving rise to new domestic terror threats. While these 
are certainly not the only issues currently facing the BRD, 
they lie firmly at forefront of the national consciousness. 
It goes without saying that nationalistic beliefs and behav-
ior is approached very skeptically by most Germans, mak-
ing the atmosphere around the debate even more polarized 
compared to other European states. Much work is left to be 
done in order to ensure that religious and cultural plural-
ity is maintained in the BRD, while also making sure that 
the wellbeing and security of its citizens are protected. Per-
forming this tightrope act will be difficult for the BRD go-
ing forward, but certainly not impossible. A mind for the 
abuses of the past along with a steady awareness of what 
perils may occur in the future are paramount in complet-
ing this task. Germany’s economic predominance in the 
EU has recently it turned into a trendsetter in policy ini-
tiatives across the continent. As such, a successful security 
strategy could set an important precedent for all European 
nations going forward in how they deal with new immi-
grants, conduct counterterrorism operations, and control 
the dangerous proliferation of nationalistic fervor. Indeed, 
widespread international attention will be focused on 
Germany as it crafts its policy to combat these pressing 
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